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Abstract
Accidental misuse of shared files by authorised users is a predominant problem. This paper proposes a
well-known static analysis approach, namely a type system, to prevent such accidental misuse. We develop
a type system that intercepts commands issued by users in a file system and enforces policies on each file.
Commands issued by users to manipulate files will be subject to type checking by the type system. Type-
checked commands are then guaranteed to not violate policies of the files. The focus of this paper is on a
particular policy that allows owners of files (users who created files) to specify the number of times a file
can be read by limiting the number of times a file can be copied. Therefore, a file can be read as much as it
can be copied. If the file cannot be copied, then it can be read only once. This approach can be extended
to other properties.
Keywords: File sharing, security types, type checking
1 Introduction
File sharing has become an indispensable part of our daily lives. The shared files
might be sensitive, thus, their confidentially, integrity and availability should be
protected. Such protection might be against external threats that are initiated by
unauthorised users or insider threats that are initiated by authorised users. Our
main interest is with insider threats, in particular trusted authorised users who
might accidentally violate files policies. The most widely used technique to protect
shared files is access control such as Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [9,7] and
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [14]. Although access control is useful to specify
who can access which information, it cannot protect sensitive information against
legitimate users. Access control is concerned with the release of information but
not its propagation. It provides a guarantee that information is released only to
authorised users. However, once information is released to authorised users, it might
be leaked maliciously or accidentally to unauthorised users without any further
control. Information ﬂow control is a complementary approach to access control
to prevent information leakage. It tracks how information propagates through a
program during execution to ensure the program does not leak sensitive information.
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Information ﬂow control can be enforced statically [4,5,15,16] or dynamically [13,2].
The former analyses information ﬂow within a program prior to executing, while
the latter analyses information during the execution. The dominant approach for
enforcing secure information ﬂow statically is the use of type systems.
This paper presents a novel approach of using a type system to solve the prob-
lem of accidental misuse of shared files by trusted authorised users. Such misuse
occurs, for example, when a trusted authorised user accidentally disseminate a file
to unauthorised users, write to a file that is meant be read only, or copy a file that
is meant to be read once, after which the file should be erased. Hence, misuse is
action that violates files policies. We design a language of commands to manipu-
late files and specify their policies in a Unix-like file system, and a type system to
enforce these policies. In this setting, files are associated with security types that
represent security policies, and programs are sets of commands to be issued on files
such as read, copy, move, etc. The type system plays the role of a reference monitor
that intercepts and statically analyses each command to be issued on a file and
determines whether or not the command is safe to be executed. Safe commands are
those which do not cause errors during execution. Such errors might be caused by
commands that violate the security policies associated with the files or violate its
own requirements (e.g., a file must exist to be removed). Therefore, if commands
are type-checked, then files and commands policies are not violated and can be
executed safely. In this paper, we focus on enforcing a particular policy, namely,
limiting the number of times a file can be read. However, the same basic ideas can
be extended to enforce other policies as pointed out in Section 6.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the security
types and policies of files. Section 3 describes the language syntax and semantics for
manipulating files, defines security errors and an algorithm for checking syntactical
errors. Section 4 describes the type system, and includes properties. Section 5
introduces a type checking algorithm and proves its soundness and completeness.
In Section 6 we give a brief review of related work, and finally we conclude the
paper in Section 7.
2 Security Types and Policies
Our approach to limiting the number of times a file can be read is by limiting the
number of copies the file can produce. Therefore, a file can be read as much as it can
be copied. If a file cannot be copied, then it can be read once. To enforce this policy,
we need to restrict the access to copy operations and restrict the information ﬂow
caused by all operations such that restrictions of files over copy operations are not
violated. To control the access to copy operations on files we define three security
types which are UC, LCn, and NC each of which specifies a distinct policy of how
copy operations can be performed on them. UC stands for Unrestricted Copy, which
means that a file associated with this type can be copied without restriction. The
copied version of a file of type UC should be allowed to be copied in the same way,
so should also be of type UC. LCn stands for Linear Copy, which means that a
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file associated with this type can be copied n number of times, after which the file
cannot be copied anymore. However, unlike UC, the copied version of a file of type
LCn should not be copied anymore. NC stands for No Copy, which means that a
file associated with this type cannot be copied at all. Hence, the copied version of
a file of type LCn should be of type NC.
NC
LCn
UC
Fig. 1. Security types
To control the information ﬂow among files, our security copy types form a
lattice (τ,⊑), where τ = {NC,LCn,UC}, are partially ordered by ⊑ (see Figure 1).
NC and UC are the upper bound and the lower bound of the set τ , respectively.
The least restrictive type is UC, while the most restrictive type is NC. Therefore,
information is allowed only to ﬂow upwards in the lattice, which means from the
less restrictive type to the more restrictive. It should be noted that LCn ⊑ LCn
′
if and only if n  n′. To formally state the policies we need to enforce, we define
the following functions and notations. The function dst stands for destination, for
a given type of a file, the function dst finds the appropriate type for the copied
version of that file. That is, dst(UC) = UC and dst(LCn) = NC ⇐⇒ n > 0.
The function red stands for reduction, for a given type of a file, the function red
reduces that type if needed when it is copied. It is mainly useful for the type LCn
to limit the number of times the type can be copied. That is, red(UC) = UC and
red(LCn) = LCn−1 ⇐⇒ n > 0. Note that we do not define dst(LCn≤0) nor
dst(NC) or red(LCn≤0) and red(NC), because files of these types are not allowed to
be copied, and hence, applying the functions on them should result in an error. Let
T (f) denotes the type associated with the file f , and T (f1)⊔T (f2) denotes the least
upper bound of the types of f1 and f2. That is, if T (f1) = NC and T (f2) = UC,
then T (f1)⊔ T (f2) = NC. Let f1 →
copy f2 denotes a ﬂow of information from f1 to
f2 caused by copy operation, f1 →
o f2 denotes a ﬂow of information caused by other
operations than copy, such as mv, cat, etc., and f1 ∈ types denotes f1 is associated
with a security type. Below we give the definitions of the policies to be enforced by
our type system.
Definition 2.1 ∀f1, f2 ∈ types. f1 →
o f2 is always allowed, provided that f2 must
change its type to T (f1) ⊔ T (f2) and f1 must be consumed after performing the
operation.
Definition 2.2 ∀f1, f2, f3 ∈ types. f1, f2 →
o f3 is always allowed, provided that
f3 must change its type to T (f1) ⊔ T (f2) ⊔ T (f3) and f1 and f2 must be consumed
after performing the operation.
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Definition 2.3 ∀f1, f2 ∈ types. f1 →
copy f2 is allowed if and only if T (f1) ∈
{UC,LCn>0}, and f2 must change its type to dst(T (f1))⊔T (f2) and f1 must change
its type to red(T (f1)) after performing the operation.
It should be noted that when a file is consumed, the file must not be available
for any subsequent operations (i.e.the file must be erased). Next we present our
language syntax and semantics, define the notion of security errors, and an algorithm
for checking syntactical errors.
3 Language Syntax and Semantics.
Let 〈f〉 be a set of valid files names for a given file system. The syntax of the
language is given by the following grammar:
〈p〉 ::= 〈cs〉 | 〈f〉
〈cs〉 ::= 〈c〉 | 〈c〉; 〈cs〉
〈c〉 ::= cp 〈f〉 〈f〉 | rm 〈f〉 | mkf 〈f〉 〈t〉 | rd 〈f〉 | cat 〈f〉 〈f〉 〈f〉 | mv 〈f〉 〈f〉
〈t〉 ::= NC | LCn | UC
The language above consists of phrases. A phrase is either a list of commands
(cs) or a file name (f). Commands can be either a single command (c) or a se-
quence of commands (c ; cs). We include commands to copy, remove, make,
read, concatenate and move files. These commands operate on a file system δ
that we represent as a set of files. A file has a name, content and a type, and
we write f(c) : τ for a file with name f , content c and type τ . For example,
δ = {f1(c1) : τ1, f2(c2) : τ2, . . . , fn(cn) : τn}. In later sections we might refer to
δ as the set of file names only (e.g., δ = {f1, f2, . . . , fn}) or the set of file names
with types only (e.g., δ = {f1 : τ1, f2 : τ2, . . . , fn : τn}). It should be apparent
from the context which δ we mean. We use the following notations: C(f) and
T (f) denote the content of file f and the type of file f , respectively. C(f1) +C(f2)
and T (f1) ⊔ T (f2) denote concatenating the content of f1 and f2, and the join
of the types of f1 and f2, respectively. We write δ[f2 ← C(f1)] for updating f2
with the content of f1 in the file system δ, and δ[f2 ← T (f1)] for updating f2
with the type of f1 in δ. Both operations require that f1 and f2 must exist in δ.
We write δ[−f ] to remove f from δ if f exists in δ, and δ[+f ] to add f to δ if f
does not already exist in δ. We write δ[f3 ← C(f1) + C(f2)] for updating f3 with
the concatenated content of f1 and f2, and δ[f3 ← T (f1) ⊔ T (f2)] for updating f3
with the join of the types of f1 and f2. Both operations require that f1, f2 and
f3 must exist in δ. Finally, we write 〈c, δ〉 → δ
′ for evaluating the command c in
δ that yields a new file system δ′. For example, if δ = {f1(c1) : τ1, f2(c2) : τ2},
then 〈rm f1, δ〉 → {f2(c2) : τ2}, 〈mv f1 f2, δ〉 → {f2(c1) : T (f1) ⊔ T (f2)}, and
〈append f1 f2 f3, δ〉 → {f3(C(f1)+C(f2)) : T (f1)⊔T (f2)}. If any of the constraints
of the operations applied to δ are not satisfied, then evaluating the configuration
〈c, δ〉 should lead to an error, written as 〈c, δ〉 → Err. Note that a sequence of
operations can be applied to δ in order from left to right. For example, the notation
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δ[+f,−f ] denotes adding file f first and then removing the file f from δ. We can
now put all these ideas together to give the semantics of commands in terms of
evaluation rules. These are given below.
〈cp f1 f2 , δ 〉 → δ[f2 ← C(f1)][f2 ← T (f2) ⊔ dst(T (f1))][f1 ← red(T (f1))]
〈rm f, δ〉 → δ[−f ]
〈mkf f t, δ〉 → δ[+f ][f ← t]
〈rd f, δ〉 → δ[−f ]
〈cat f1 f2 f3, δ〉 →
δ[f3 ← C(f1) + C(f2)][f3 ← T (f1) ⊔ T (f2) ⊔ T (f3)][−f1,−f2]
〈mv f1 f2 , δ 〉 → δ[f2 ← C(f1)][f2 ← T (f1) ⊔ T (f2)][−f1]
From the single-step transitions, we can define the semantics of sequences of
commands as the (small-step) operational semantics as shown below:
〈c, δ 〉 ⇒ δ′
(ecs)
〈c; cs, δ〉 ⇒ 〈cs, δ′〉
〈c, δ 〉 → δ′
(ec)
〈c, δ〉 ⇒ δ′
We write ⇒∗ as usual for the reﬂexive and transitive closure of ⇒. Therefore, a
sequence of commands can be computed by: 〈c, δ〉 ⇒∗ δ′.
3.1 Security Errors
Security errors can be divided into syntactical errors and type errors. Syntactical
errors occur when the constraints of an operation applied to δ are not satisfied. For
example, if δ = {f1(c1) : τ1, f2(c2) : τ2}, then evaluating the configuration 〈rm f4, δ〉
should lead to an error, that is 〈rm f4, δ〉 → Err, because the operation δ[−f4]
requires f4 to exist in δ. On the other hand, type errors occur when the constraints a
function applied to a type of a file are not satisfied. For example, if T (f1) = NC, then
〈cp f1 f2, δ〉 → Err, because the function dst(NC) results in an error. Syntactical
and type constraints are shown in Table 1 and 2. It can be seen that content update
operations in Table 1 (i.e. δ[f2 ← C(f1)] and δ[f3 ← C(f1) + C(f2)]) require files
names to be distinct. Such constraint is very important to rule out errors that result
from evaluating configurations such as 〈cat f1 f1 f3, δ〉, which erases f1 twice, and
to rule out accidental erasure of files that result from evaluating configurations such
as 〈cat f1 f2 f1, δ〉 and 〈mv f1 f1, δ〉, which have the same eﬀect as evaluating the
configuration 〈rm f1, δ〉. Next we present our algorithm for checking syntactical
errors.
3.2 Syntactical checking for correctness
An occurrence of a file name in a command determines whether or not the command
can be successfully evaluated in a particular file system δ. Some commands, such
as (rm f), require the file name to exist in δ, while others, such as (mkf f t), require
them to not exist. Checking commands individually with respect to a particular
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Operation Constraints
δ[+f ] f ∈ δ
δ[−f ] f ∈ δ
δ[f2 ← T (f1)] f1, f2 ∈ δ
δ[f2 ← C(f1)] f1, f2 ∈ δ ∧ f1 = f2
δ[f3 ← T (f1) unionsq T (f2)] f1, f2, f3 ∈ δ
δ[f3 ← C(f1) + C(f2)] f1, f2, f3 ∈ δ ∧ f1 = f2, f1 = f3, f2 = f3
Table 1
Constraints of operations applied to δ
Operation Constraints
dst(τ) τ ∈ {UC,LCn>0}
red(τ) τ ∈ {UC,LCn>0}
Table 2
Constraints of operations applied
to types
file system does not work however. For example, consider the file system δ =
{f1(c1) : τ1, f2(c2) : τ2}, then the configuration 〈rm f1; rm f1, δ〉 will fail to evaluate
because the first command will remove f1 from δ so that the second will generate
an error. A similar situation arises with the configuration 〈mkf f3 t; mkf f3 t, δ〉. In
this case, the first command will succeed, but the second will fail because the file
f3 is already there. Therefore, since command evaluation changes δ, such changes
must be considered by subsequent commands when checking occurrences of file
names. We define an algorithm to check consistency of commands in the following
way. For a given command cs, we compute a 4-tuple (H,N,C,E) that gives the
constraints on a starting file system δ so that it can execute without errors. H
denotes the set of file names that must exist in δ, N denotes the set of file names
that must not exist in δ. C denotes the set of file names that are created by the
sequence of commands, such file names do not necessarily have to be in δ initially.
E denotes the set of file names that are erased by the sequence of commands, so
such files do not necessarily have to be free in δ initially. Table 3 gives the heart
of the algorithm. We write c(H,N,C,E) = (H ′, N ′, C ′, E′) if an atomic command
c satisfies the conditions in the table, where (H ′, N ′, C ′, E′) are the sets updated
by the command c. Sequences of commands are then computed by composition:
c; cs(H,N,C,E) = cs(c(H,N,C,E)). The algorithm starts with (∅,∅,∅,∅).
Term H N C E Condition
cp f1 f2 H ∪ ({f1, f2} − C) N C E f1 /∈ E, f2 ∈ E,
f1 = f2
rm f H ∪ ({f} − C) N C − {f} E ∪ {f} f /∈ E
mkf f t H N ∪ ({f} − E) C ∪ {f} E − {f} f /∈ C
rd f H ∪ ({f} − C) N C − {f} E ∪ {f} f /∈ E
cat f1 f2 f3 H ∪ ({f1, f2, f3} − C) N C − {f1, f2} E ∪ ({f1, f2} f1 /∈ E, f2 ∈ E, f3 ∈ E,
f1 = f2, f1 = f3, f2 = f3
mv f1 f2 H ∪ ({f1, f2} − C) N C − {f1} E ∪ {f1} f1 /∈ E, f2 ∈ E
f1 = f2
Table 3
Algorithm for syntactically checking commands
An example of using the algorithm is the command cp f1 f2:
cp f1f2 (∅,∅,∅,∅) = ({f1, f2},∅,∅,∅).
This means that the files {f1, f2} must be part of the file system when this
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command is executed. A second example is a sequence of commands mkf f1 t; rm f1:
mkf f1 t; rm f1(∅,∅,∅,∅) = rm f1(mkf f1 t(∅,∅,∅,∅)) Since f1 /∈ C, then
= rm f1(∅, {f1}, {f1},∅) and since f1 /∈ E, then
= (∅, {f1},∅, {f1})
This means that there are no files needed in δ to execute these commands success-
fully, and if there are any files, then the file name f1 cannot be used. When a
command does not satisfy the conditions in the table, the algorithm fails. Consider
a sequence of commands mkf f1 t; mkf f1 t:
mkf f1 t; mkf f1 t(∅,∅,∅,∅) = mkf f1 t(mkf f1 t(∅,∅,∅,∅)) Since f1 /∈ C
= mkf f1 t(∅, {f1}, {f1},∅)
however, since the condition f1 /∈ C is not satisfied, then mkf f1 t(∅, {f1}, {f1},∅)
fails. Similarly, a sequence of commands such as rm f1; rm f1:
rm f1; rm f1(∅,∅,∅,∅)) = rm f1(rm f1(∅,∅,∅,∅)). Since f1 ∈ E, then
= rm f1({f1},∅,∅, {f1})
however, since the condition f1 ∈ E is not satisfied, then, rm f1({f1},∅,∅, {f1})
should fail. Table 3 captures the idea that any file name of a command that needs
to be in δ must not have been removed by previous commands and any file name
of a command that needs not to be in δ must not have been created by previous
commands. Furthermore, file names of a command must be distinct. We can relate
these syntactical constraints with the operational semantics through the following
result which states that if the file system satisfies the constraints needed for a
command as set out above, then it will execute successfully (i.e., without error).
Essentially, this key result gives the constraints on the file system: which files must
be present, and which files must not be present.
Theorem 3.1 For any command sequence cs, if cs(∅,∅,∅,∅) = (H,N,C,E),
then for any file system δ, if H ⊆ δ and N ∩ δ = ∅, then there exists a file system
δ′ such that 〈cs, δ〉 ⇒∗ δ′.
4 Type System
Now we present the type system that will check commands to ensure they are free
of syntactical and type errors before execution. Typing judgements have the form
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ p : τ where Γ is a list of files with types of the form f : τ . We write ∅ for
the empty list. For example, Γ = f1 : τ1, f2 : τ2, f3 : τ3, . . . , fn : τn. It should be
noted that files in the context Γ are unique and the symbol “,” is the disjoint union
operation, so that the list of files in Γ does not contain repetitions. The judgement
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ p : τ means that typing the phrase p of type τ in the context Γ, will change
the context to Γ′. In other words, the contexts Γ and Γ′ represent the set of files
before and after typing the phrase p. Note that a phrase p could be a command or
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a file name. The typing rules are shown in Figure 2. Rule (f) says that typing a file
from the context Γ consumes the file from the context. Rule (cs) says that if typing
the command c of type void changes the context Γ to Γ′ and typing the command cs
of type void changes the context Γ′ to Γ′′, then typing these commands in sequence
changes the context Γ to Γ′′. Rule (cp) says that if we can type f1 and f2 from the
context Γ and f1 is of type UC or LC
n>0, then we can type the command cp f1 f2
of type void and the type of f2 is changed to be the least upper bound of its type
and the type of dst(f2) and the type of f1 is changed to be the type of red(f1).
Rules (rm) and (rd) say that if we can type f from the context Γ, then we can type
the command rm f of type void and the command rd f of type void, respectively.
Rule (mkf) says that typing the command mkf f t of type void will add f of type t
to the context Γ. Rule (cat) says that if we can type f1, f2 and f3 from the context
Γ, then we can type the command cat f1 f2 f3 of type void and f1 and f2 will be
consumed from the context Γ while the type of f3 is changed to be the least upper
bound of its type, the type of f1 and the type of f2. Rule (mv) says that if we can
type f1 and f2 from the context Γ, then we can type the command mv f1 f2 of type
void and f1 and will be consumed from the context Γ while the type of f2 is changed
to be the least upper bound of its type and the type of f1. Examples of commands
derivations are given in Appendix A.
(f)
Γ, f : τ | Γ ⊢ f : τ
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ c : void Γ′ | Γ′′ ⊢ cs : void
(cs)
Γ | Γ′′ ⊢ c; cs : void
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f1 : τ τ ⊑ LC
n>0 Γ′ | Γ′′ ⊢ f2 : τ
′
(cp)
Γ | Γ′′, f1 : red(τ), f2 : τ
′ ⊔ dst(τ) ⊢ cp f1 f2 : void
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f : τ
(rm)
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ rm f : void
(mkf)
Γ | Γ, f : t ⊢ mkf f t : void
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f : τ
(rd)
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ rd f : void
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f1 : τ Γ
′ | Γ′′ ⊢ f2 : τ
′ Γ′′ | Γ′′′ ⊢ f3 : τ
′′
(cat)
Γ | Γ′′′, f3 : τ ⊔ τ
′ ⊔ τ ′′ ⊢ cat f1 f2 f3 : void
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f1 : τ Γ
′ | Γ′′ ⊢ f2 : τ
′
(mv)
Γ | Γ′′, f2 : τ ⊔ τ
′ ⊢ mv f1 f2 : void
Fig. 2. Typing rules
4.1 Properties of Type System
We prove the soundness and completeness of our type system with respect to the
operational semantics. The soundness property is proved by showing two properties
which are preservation and progress. Traditionally, the progress theorem states that
a program is either a value or can take a step of evaluation. However, in our case,
programs are commands that operate on files in a file system, and should always
take a step of evaluation. Therefore, if a command c is typable in a particular file
system δ, then the command c must take a step of evaluation.
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Theorem 4.1 (Progress) If Γ = δ and Γ | Γ′ ⊢ c : τ , then 〈c, δ〉 → Err.
Proof. We proceed by cases on typing derivation of c. There are 6 cases, we show
only two.
(i) c = cp f1 f2
We know there is a typing derivation for c by using rule (cp) with conclusion:
Γ | Γ′′, f1 : red(τ), f2 : τ
′ ⊔ dst(τ) ⊢ cp f1 f2 : void. We must also have
subderivations with conclusions: Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f1 : τ , τ ⊑ LC
n>0 and Γ′ | Γ′′ ⊢ f2 :
τ ′. Now we can use rule (1) to obtain 〈cp f1 f2 , δ〉 → δ[f2 ← C(f1)][f2 ←
T (f2) ⊔ dst(T (f1))][f1 ← red(T (f1))]. Since the configuration 〈cp f1 f2 , δ〉
require f1 ∈ δ and f2 ∈ δ and f1 = f2 to be evaluated without syntactical
error, and we have f1 ∈ Γ and f2 ∈ Γ and f1 = f2 in Γ, because Γ does not
allow repetition of file names, and Γ = δ. Then, 〈cp f1 f2 , δ 〉 →
s Err. Also,
since the operations dst(T (f1)) and red(T (f1)) requires (T (f1)) ⊑ LC
n>0 in δ
and we have T (f1) ⊑ LC
n>0 in Γ and Γ = δ. Then, 〈cp f1 f2 , δ 〉 → Err as
required.
(ii) c = rd f
We know there is a typing derivation for c by using rule (rd) with conclusion:
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ rd f : void. We must also have a sub-derivation with conclusion:
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f : τ . Now we can use rule (4) to obtain 〈rd f, δ〉 → δ[−f ]. Since
the configuration 〈rd f, δ〉 requires f ∈ δ to be evaluated without syntactical
error, and we have f ∈ Γ and Γ = δ. Then 〈rd f, δ〉 → Err.
✷
Traditionally, the preservation theorem states that as we evaluated a program,
its type is preserved at each evaluation step. However, programs manipulate files
and their types, and we need to ensure that types of files are preserved during
evaluation. Therefore, if a command is typable in a particular file system δ, then
types of files we obtain by typing the command must be preserved in the file system
we obtain by evaluating the command. This property shows the consistency of
the type system with the operational semantics, that is not only typed commands
evaluate without errors, but also the types of files in the file system after evaluating
the command correspond to the types of files resulted from typing the commands.
Theorem 4.2 (Preservation) If Γ = δ and Γ | Γ′ ⊢ c : τ , and 〈c, δ〉 → δ′, then
Γ′ = δ′.
Proof. We proceed by cases on 〈c, δ〉 → δ′. There are 6 cases, we only show two.
(i) c = 〈cp f1 f2 , δ 〉 → δ[f2 ← C(f1)][f2 ← T (f2) ⊔ dst(T (f1))][f1 ← red(T (f1))]
We know there is a typing derivation for c by using rule (cp) with conclusion:
Γ | Γ′′, f1 : red(τ), f2 : τ
′ ⊔ dst(τ) ⊢ cp f1 f2 : void. We must also have
subderivations with conclusions: Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f1 : τ , τ ⊑ LC
n>0 and Γ′ | Γ′′ ⊢ f2 :
τ ′. To compress the proof let δ′ = δ[f2 ← C(f1)][f2 ← T (f2)⊔dst(T (f1))][f1 ←
red(T (f1))]. Now we have 6 cases based on typing f1 and f2, we show two of
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them.
(a) : Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f1 : LC
n>0,Γ′ | Γ′′ ⊢ f2 : UC
In this case, the typing derivation of c must have the form Γ | Γ′′, f1 :
LCn−1, f2 : NC ⊢ cp f1 f2 : void. Let Γ
′ = Γ′′, f1 : LC
n−1, f2 : NC.
Now we know that Γ = Γ′ because Γ(f1) = Γ
′(f1) and Γ(f2) = Γ
′(f2),
that is LCn>0 = LCn−1 and UC = NC, respectively. We also know that
δ = δ′ because δ(f1) = δ
′(f1) and δ(f2) = δ
′(f2), that is LC
n>0 = LCn−1
and UC = NC, respectively. Since Γ = Γ′ because Γ(f1) = Γ
′(f1) and
Γ(f2) = Γ
′(f2), and δ = δ
′ because δ(f1) = δ
′(f1) and δ(f2) = δ
′(f2),
and Γ′(f1) = δ
′(f1) that is LC
n−1 = LCn−1 and Γ′(f2) = δ
′(f2) that is
NC = NC, and Γ = δ. Then, Γ′ = δ′ as required.
(b) : Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f1 : LC
n>0,Γ′ | Γ′′ ⊢ f2 : NC
In this case, the typing derivation of c must have the form Γ | Γ′′, f1 :
LCn−1, f2 : NC ⊢ cp f1 f2 : void. Let Γ
′ = Γ′′, f1 : LC
n−1, f2 : NC. Now
we know that Γ = Γ′ because Γ(f1) = Γ
′(f1), that is LC
n>0 = LCn−1.
We also know that δ = δ′ because δ(f1) = δ
′(f1), that is LC
n>0 = LCn−1.
Since Γ = Γ′ because Γ(f1) = Γ
′(f1), and δ = δ
′ because δ(f1) = δ
′(f1),
and Γ′(f1) = δ
′(f1), that is LC
n−1 = LCn−1 and Γ = δ. Then, Γ′ = δ′ as
required.
(ii) c = 〈rm f, δ〉 → δ[−f ]
We know there is a typing derivation for c by using rule (rm) with conclusion:
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ rm f : void. We must also have sub-derivation with conclusion:
Γ | Γ′ ⊢ f : τ . We know that Γ = Γ′ because f ∈ Γ′. We also know that
δ = δ[−f ] because f ∈ δ[−f ]. Since Γ = Γ′ because f ∈ Γ′ and δ = δ[−f ]
because f ∈ δ[−f ], and Γ = δ. Then, Γ′ = δ[−f ] as required.
✷
Now we show the completeness property of the type system with respect to the
operations semantics. The completeness property is useful since it shows that the
operational semantics are not unnecessarily restricted by the type system. That is
the type system does not provide false negative results. The completeness theorem
states that if a command c can be evaluated in a particular file system δ without
an error, then the command c must be typable.
Theorem 4.3 (Completeness) If 〈c, δ〉 → Err and Γ = δ, then Γ | Γ′ ⊢ c : τ
for some Γ′.
Proof. We proceed by cases on commands c. There are 6 cases, we show only two.
(i) c = cp f1 f2
If 〈cp f1 f2, δ〉 → Err, then it must be the case that f1 = f2, f1 ∧ f2 ∈ δ
and δ(f1) ∈ {UC,LC
n>0}. Therefore, since Γ = δ, we know there is a typing
derivation for f1 and f2, and Γ(f1) ∈ {UC,LC
n>0}:
(f)
Γ | Γ− {f1} ⊢ f1 : τ
(f)
Γ | Γ− {f2} ⊢ f2 : τ
′
R. Alsowail, I. Mackie / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 332 (2017) 3–2012
Now by the (cp) rule, there is also a derivation:
Γ | Γ− {f1} ⊢ f1 : τ τ ⊑ LC
n>0 Γ− {f1} | Γ− {f1, f2} ⊢ f2 : τ
′
(cp)
Γ | Γ− {f1, f2}+ {f1 : red(τ), f2 : τ
′ ⊔ dst(τ)} ⊢ cp f1 f2 : void
(ii) c = rd f
If 〈rd f, δ〉 → Err, then it must be the case that f ∈ δ. Therefore, since
Γ = δ, we know there is a typing derivation for f :
(f)
Γ | Γ− {f} ⊢ f : τ
Now by the (rd) rule, there is also a derivation:
Γ | Γ− {f} ⊢ f : τ
(rd)
Γ | Γ− {f} ⊢ rd f : void
✷
It is useful to show that commands in our language are monotonically increasing,
in the sense that types of files never decrease during commands evaluation. This is
a straightforward property since we only allow commands to change a type of a file
to be the least upper bound of its type and the source type. Since the least upper
bound of any two types will be at least as restrictive as both of them, types of files
will never decrease.
Theorem 4.4 (Monotonicity of files types) If Γ | Γ′ ⊢ c : τ , then ∀f, f ′ ∈
Γ ∧ Γ′, if Γ(f) ⊑ Γ(f ′), then Γ′(f) ⊑ Γ′(f ′)
5 Typing Algorithm
Here we give an algorithm T for typing commands. We define a number of helper
functions: check(α, β) returns true if the types are compatible. Note that any two
diﬀerent base types are not compatible, e.g., check(LCn, void) will fail. less(τ, τ ′)
returns true if τ ⊑ τ ′. lub(τ, . . . , τn) returns the least upper bound of all its param-
eters i.e., τ ⊔ . . . ⊔ τn. Using these functions, we can now define the type checking
algorithm T :
T (A, e) = (τ, A′)
where:
(i) If e is the filename f , and f : α ∈ A then τ = α, A′ = A {f : α}.
(ii) If e is a sequence of commands, c; cs let
(β,A1) = T (A, c)
check(β, void)
(α,A2) = T (A1, cs)
check(α, void)
then τ = void, A′ = A2.
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(iii) If e is the command cp f1 f2 let
(β,A1) = T (A, f1)
less(β,LCn>0)
(α,A2) = T (A1, f2)
then if f1, f2 ∈ A2, then τ = void, A
′ = A2 ∪ {f1 : red(β), f2 : lub(α, dst(β))}.
(iv) If e is the command rm f let (α,A1) = T (A, f), then τ = void, A
′ = A1.
(v) If e is the command mkf f t, then if f ∈ A, then τ = void, A′ = A ∪ {f : t}.
(vi) If e is the command rd f let (α,A1) = T (A, f), then τ = void, A
′ = A1.
(vii) If e is the command cat f1 f2 f3 let
(β,A1) = T (A, f1)
(α,A2) = T (A1, f2)
(δ, A3) = T (A2, f3)
then if f3 ∈ A3, then τ = void, A
′ = A3 ∪ {f3 : lub(β, α, δ)}.
(viii) If e is the command mv f1 f2 let
(β,A1) = T (A, f1)
(α,A2) = T (A1, f2)
then if f2 ∈ A2, then τ = void, A
′ = A2 ∪ {f2 : lub(β, α)}.
5.1 Properties of Algorithm T
If T finds a type for a command, then there is a derivation for that command. This
property is called soundness, and means that the algorithm will not give wrong an-
swers. We first prove soundness, then show that the algorithm can find all deriva-
tions, a property called completeness.
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness of T ) If T (A, e) succeeds with (τ, A′), then there is a
derivation ending in A | A′ ⊢ e : τ .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of the command e. There are 8
cases, here we show a selection of them.
(i) If e is the filename f and f : τ ∈ A ∪ {f : τ}, then T (A ∪ {f : τ}, f) succeeds
immediately with (τ, A). Using the (f) rule, there is a derivation ending in
A, f : τ | A ⊢ f : τ as required.
(ii) If e is the sequence of commands c; cs, then T (A, c) succeeds with (β,A1),
check(β, void) succeeds, T (A1, cs) succeeds with (α,A2), and check(α, void)
also succeeds. Now, by the inductive hypothesis twice, there are derivations
A | A1 ⊢ c : void and A1 | A2 ⊢ cs : void. Using the (cs) rule, there is a
derivation A | A2 ⊢ c; cs : void as required.
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(iii) If e is the command cp f1 f2, then T (A, f1) succeeds with (β,A1) and T (A1, f2)
succeeds with (α,A2). By the inductive hypothesis twice, there are derivations
ending in A | A1 ⊢ f1 : β and A1 | A2 ⊢ f2 : α. Since less(β, LC), we have
β ⊑ LC and now we can use the (cp) rule to give a derivation of A | A2, f1 :
β, f2 : α ⊔ dst(β) ⊢ cp f1 f2 : void as required.
(iv) If e is the command rm f , then T (A, f) succeeds with (α,A1). By the inductive
hypothesis, there is a derivation of A | A1 ⊢ f : α. Now we can use the (rm)
rule to give a derivation of A | A1 ⊢ rm f : void as required.
(v) If e is the command mkf f t and f ∈ A, then T (A, (mkf f t)) succeeds im-
mediately with (void, A ∪ {f : τ}). Using the (mkf) rule, there is a derivation
A | A, f : t ⊢ mkf f t : void as required.
✷
Theorem 5.2 (Completeness of T ) If there is a derivation ending in A | A′ ⊢
e : τ , then T (A, e) succeeds with (τ, A′).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of the command e. There are 8
cases, here we show a selection of them.
(i) If e is the file name f and f : τ ∈ A ∪ {f : τ}, then by (f) rule, there is a
derivation ending in A, f : τ | A ⊢ f : τ . Now, T (A ∪ {f : τ}, f) succeeds with
(τ, A) as required.
(ii) If e is the sequence of commands c; cs, then by (cs) rule there is a derivation
ending in A | A2 ⊢ c; cs : void which consists of two derivations: A | A1 ⊢
c : void and A1 | A2 ⊢ cs : void. By the induction hypothesis twice, T (A, c)
succeeds with (void, A1) for the first derivation and T (A1, cs) succeeds with
(void, A2) for the second derivation. Now T (A, (c, cs)) succeeds with (void, A2).
(iii) If e is the command cp f1 f2, then by (cp) rule, there is a derivation ending in
A | A2, f1 : β, f2 : α⊔dst(β) ⊢ cp f1 f2 : void which consists of two derivations:
A | A′1 ⊢ f1 : β and A | A2 ⊢ f2 : α. By the induction hypothesis twice and
since β ⊑ LC we have less(β, LC), T (A, f1) succeeds with (β,A1) for the first
derivation, and T (A1, f2) succeeds with (α,A2) for the second derivation. Now
T (A, (cp f1 f2)) succeeds with (void, A2 ∪ {f1 : β, f2 : lub(α, dst(β))}).
(iv) If e is the command rm f , then by (rm) rule there is a derivation ending in
A | A1 ⊢ rm f : void which consists of one derivation: A | A1 ⊢ f : β. by
the induction hypothesis, T (A, f) succeeds with (β,A1). Now T (A, (rm f))
succeeds with (void, A1).
(v) If e is the command mkf f t and f ∈ A, then by (mkf) rule, there is a derivation
ending in A | A, f : τ ⊢ mkf f t : void. Now, T (A, (mkf f t)) succeeds with
(void, A ∪ {f : τ}) as required.
✷
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6 Related Work and Discussion
Denning [5] pioneered the use of static analysis to identify if the information ﬂow of a
program satisfies an application-specific confidentiality policy. Following their work,
many security type systems have been developed [1,8,17] beginning with Volpano
et al. [15] and Volpano and Smith [16] who were the first to formulate Denning’s
secure information ﬂow analysis [4,5] as a type system and prove its soundness. The
intuition is that secure information ﬂow is guaranteed for a program if the program
is type-checked correctly. A comprehensive survey of the large body of work on this
aspect, can be found in [12].
The majority of security type systems focus on enforcing a property known as
non-interference [6,15,12,11]. Non-interference for confidentiality requires that pub-
lic output is independent from secret input, and for integrity requires that trusted
output is independent from untrusted input. However, non-interference is a very re-
strictive property since it does not allow downgrading of security levels from high to
low which in practice is needed in many applications. We take a diﬀerent approach
to non-interference, and define our security property as the absence of run-time er-
rors which are raised by commands that violate files policies. In this way we could
easily augment our language with commands that declassify the security levels of
information and allow owners of files to execute such commands. Hence, executing
such commands by a user who is not an owner should lead to an error.
Furthermore, enforcing non-interference can only control how information ﬂows
from one security level to another; but cannot control how information at a par-
ticular security level is manipulated [10,3]. For example, regardless of the security
level assigned to a variable, the variable can be read, concatenated with itself and
saved back as long as these operations only manipulate the variable at the same
security level assigned to it. This is because conventional security levels represent
only information ﬂow policies which restrict the information ﬂow but not the op-
erations which cause such ﬂow. Our security types, however, represent both access
control and information ﬂow policies which restrict the operations to be performed
on types and the information ﬂow caused by performing the operations.
Broadly, two kinds of information ﬂow policies can be enforced, based on whether
the type system is ﬂow-insensitive or ﬂow-sensitive. In ﬂow-insensitive type systems,
such as in [15], variables are assigned fixed security levels. Information can ﬂow from
variable y to variable x if and only if ly ⊑ lx, that is the security level of x is at
least as restrictive as the security level of y. On the other hand, in ﬂow-sensitive
type systems [8], information can ﬂow from variable y to variable x without the
restriction ly ⊑ lx. However, the security level of x must be changed to be the same
as the security level of y after the ﬂow of information.
The information ﬂow policy enforced by our type system is somewhere in between
the ﬂow policies enforced by ﬂow-insensitive and ﬂow-sensitive type systems. We
follow the idea of ﬂow-insensitive type system in that ﬂow of information must
only result in more restrictive type of information while we follow the idea of ﬂow-
sensitive type system in that information can ﬂow any where and the security types
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can be changed during computation. This can be achieved by allowing information
to ﬂow from a security τ1 to any security type τ2, provided that the security type
τ2 is changed to the least upper bound of τ1 and τ2 (i.e., τ1 ⊔ τ2), after the ﬂow
of information. Since ∀τ, τ ′ ∈ T , τ ⊑ τ ⊔ τ ′, where T is lattice of security types,
any information ﬂow is considered a restriction as long as the destination changes
its type to the least upper bound of its type and the source type. This is because
the least upper bound of two types is always more restrictive than each of them
separately. In this way we benefit from the ﬂexibility ﬂow-sensitive type systems of
and the restrictiveness of ﬂow-insensitive type systems.
Types of files are not necessarily stored with file names and contents in the file
system δ. They can be separated from δ and stored in a diﬀerent location (e.g.,
∆) and fetched upon request by the type system. For example, δ will be the set
of file names with contents (e.g., {f1(c1), . . . , fn(cn)}) and ∆ will be the set of file
names with types (e.g., {f1 : τ1, . . . , fn : τn}). For checking commands that need
to be executed, the type system makes ∆ to be the typing context to begin with.
Once all the commands are type-checked correctly, the resulting typing context
after the checking (e.g., Γ′) should replace the types of files stored in ∆. In this
way, we could have an untyped operational semantics that relies solely on the safety
guarantee given by the type system. In fact, the reason for having typed operational
semantics is just to simplify the soundness proof of the type system—once we have
established this result, we can optimise these out.
The type system developed in this paper is only concerned with copy operations.
This is because it enforces the number of times a file can be read by limiting the
number of copies a file can produce. Therefore, the defined security types in this
paper specify policies that restrict the access to copy operations (access control
policy), and restrict the information ﬂow caused by all operations including copy,
such that copy policies of files are not violated (information ﬂow policy). Other
policies can be enforced similarly by defining new security types that restrict the
access to the relevant operations and the ﬂow caused by them. For example, to
specify policies that restrict the access to read and write operations which are
caused by rd, cat, cp and mv operations, we can define the following security types
NRW,RO,WO−,WO+,RW−,RW+. NRW stands for NoReadOrwrite, RO stands
for ReadOnly, WO stands for WriteOnly, and RW stands for ReadWrite. The
symbol (+) means a file of this type cannot be overwritten while the symbol (−)
means a file of this type can be overwritten. Since we can only write to a file of
type RW or WO, these symbols are associated only with them. Hence the typing
rule should restrict rd operation to be performed on a file of type ⊑ RO, cat
operation to be performed on source files of type ⊑ WO+ and a destination file of
type ⊑ WO−, cp operation to be performed on destination file of type ⊑ WO−,
and mv operation to be performed on destination file of type ⊑ WO−. To restrict
the ﬂow of information caused by these operations such that policies for read and
write operations are not violated, we let these types form a lattice of security types
(τ,⊑) where τ = {NRW,RO,WO−,WO+,RW−,RW+}, are partially ordered by ⊑
(see Figure 3). Hence, information can only ﬂow from less restrictive types to more
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restrictive types.
NRW
RO WO+
WO−RW +
RW −
Fig. 3. Security access types
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented our approach to prevent accidental misuse of the
shared files. The focus was on enforcing a particular policy, namely limiting the
number of times a file can be read. This is achieved by developing a type system
that controls the access to copy operations and the ﬂow caused by all operations
including copy, such that the policies for copying files are not violated. The type
system plays the role of a reference monitor that intercepts each command and
checks whether or not the command will cause run-time errors. Run-time errors are
caused by executing commands that violate files policies. Therefore, type-checked
commands are safe to be executed since they do not cause any policy violation. We
have proven the soundness and completeness of the type system with respect to
the operations semantics and define a type checking algorithm that is shown to be
sound and complete.
The language and the type system presented in this paper is kept to a minimum
to avoid complexity in presenting our approach. Various extensions useful in prac-
tice including conditionals, loops, recursion, and variables are left for future work.
We aimed to start this line of research with a very simple language with the desired
properties and then extending it while ensuring these properties are still preserved.
In future work we aim to extend the language with various features and the type
system to enforce diﬀerent kinds of policies useful in practice.
So far we have taken a significant step towards realising these features. In
particular, we extended the type system to enforce additional policies to control
read and write operations. By defining a new set of security types to control read
and write operations, we found that the same typing rules presented in this paper
with a few additional constraints can be used to enforce the new policies. Therefore,
we have added these additional constraints to the current type system and defined
security types of files as pairs that consist of a security copy type and a security
access type. The former type represents a policy to control the access and ﬂow of
copy operations; and the latter type represents a policy to control the access and
ﬂow of read and write operations. The resulting type system controls the access to
copy, read and write operations and the ﬂow caused by all operations.
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We have also extended the policies of files to specify which operations can be
performed on which types of files and by whom. We have done this by defining
security types of files as labels that not only consist of a security copy type and
a security access type, but also of ownership and authorisation information. The
ownership and authorisation information in a label indicates the owners and the
authorised users of a file associated with the label. Based on the definition of
labels, we extended the type system to not only control the access and ﬂow of
operations but also control which user can perform these operations. Furthermore,
we have also looked at possible extensions to allow owners to manipulate their files
policies. Thus, we extended the commands in our language to include commands
that manipulate file policies. Accordingly, we extended the type system with typing
rules for these commands along with a typing algorithm for typing phrases.
While the extensions described above have been added to our current work, they
are still missing an important aspect. Further investigation and formal proofs their
properties are required. We are currently developing various proofs of the extended
system to ensure the desired properties of the system are still preserved.
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